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This paper discusses several equivalence issues in abduction and induction. Three different
problems: equivalence of theories, equivalence of explanations, and equivalence of
observations are considered in the context of ﬁrst-order logic and nonmonotonic logic
programming. Necessary and suﬃcient conditions for those problems, and computational
complexity results are provided. These equivalence measures provide methods for compar-
ing different abductive or inductive theories, and also state conditions for optimizing those
theories in program development.
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1. Introduction
Consider a multiagent society where individual agents have their own knowledge bases. To solve problems cooperatively,
agents must share their information in the society. It is likely, however, that the same information is represented in dif-
ferent ways by each agent. To understand information contents and to identify different information sources, the notion of
equivalence relation between theories is important. The equivalence relation between theories is also utilized in program
development. Given a speciﬁcation of a problem, a programmer transforms it into an executable program which would be
further optimized to increase eﬃciency. In every step, a program is requested to be semantically equivalent to the original
speciﬁcation.
There is a number of ways for identifying different logical theories. In classical logic, two ﬁrst-order theories are equiv-
alent if they have the same logical consequences. In logic programming, two logic programs are equivalent if they have the
same semantics [13]; and a stronger notion of equivalence is used under the name of strong equivalence [12] or update equiv-
alence [8]. These equivalence relations compare capabilities of deductive reasoning between theories. On the other hand,
considering intelligent agents that can perform commonsense reasoning, it is necessary to have a framework of comparing
capabilities of non-deductive reasoning like abduction and induction. This motivates the studies by Inoue and Sakama [9,10,
18] which introduce several criteria for identifying abductive or inductive theories.
Abduction and induction have analogous inference mechanisms: they both produce hypotheses to explain observations
using background theories [4]. There are at least three parameters in this task: theories, explanations, and observations.
Several equivalence issues are then considered:
Equivalence of theories: Two abductive (or inductive) theories are considered equivalent if they produce the same explana-
tions for any observation. This equivalence measure is useful for comparing “information contents” of different theories.
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given abductive (or inductive) theory. This equivalence measure is useful for comparing “explanatory power” of different
explanations.
Equivalence of observations: Two observations are considered equivalent if they have the same explanations under a given
abductive (or inductive) theory. This equivalence measure is useful for comparing “evidential power” of different obser-
vations.
The conditions for those equivalence issues generally depend on the logic on which abduction or induction is based.
Moreover, those conditions differ among individual abduction (or induction) algorithms. Inoue and Sakama [9,10] study the
problem of equivalence of abductive theories under ﬁrst-order logic and abductive logic programming (ALP). Pearce et al.
[16] characterize a part of the problem in the context of equilibrium logic. Sakama and Inoue [18] study the corresponding
problem in induction and compare conditions for different algorithms in inductive logic programming (ILP). On the other
hand, equivalence issues with respect to explanations or observations have not been studied so far.
These equivalence measures provide methods for identifying abductive or inductive capabilities of different theories.
Moreover, those measures are meaningful and important in the following aspects.
(1) From the viewpoint of program development, if a theory T1 is transformed to another syntactically different T2, equiv-
alence of theories guarantees identiﬁcation of results of abduction (or induction) from each theory. This provides
guidelines for optimizing background theories as well as candidate hypotheses in abduction and induction.
(2) It may happen that some algorithm may produce different explanations for the same observation from two theories due
to its incorrectness or incompleteness. If two equivalent theories produce different hypotheses in face of some common
observations, it indicates that the algorithm is incomplete or incorrect. Thus, equivalence of theories would be used for
testing and verifying correctness and completeness of an algorithm.
(3) In system diagnoses, several explanations exist for system failures. If two different disorders of components explain the
same system failure, those components may cause the failure interactively. Thus, equivalence of explanations would be
used for identifying interrelation of possible causes.
(4) If different observations turn out to be equivalent, they are different appearance of the same phenomenon. For instance,
when a person has a sore throat and another person sniﬄes, a doctor would diagnose both of them as suffering from
hay fever. By identifying different symptoms, the same prescription is applied in diagnoses.
Thus, equivalence in abduction and induction is useful not only for identifying different theories, but for program devel-
opment, veriﬁcation, and diagnoses.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss those equivalence issues for abduction and induction, and to investigate formal
properties. We ﬁrst review the results of [9–11,18] on the equivalence of abductive (or inductive) theories in Section 2. We
then investigate the remaining two problems: equivalence of explanations in Section 3 and equivalence of observations in
Section 4. We provide results under two logics, ﬁrst-order logic and (nonmonotonic) logic programming, which are the two
most popular logics used in the literature of abduction and induction. Section 5 discusses the results of this paper, and
Section 6 summarizes the paper.
2. Equivalence of abductive theories
2.1. Abductive equivalence in ﬁrst-order logic
In this section, we ﬁrst consider the case that the underlying logic is ﬁrst-order logic. The ﬁrst-order language consists of
an alphabet and all formulas deﬁned over it. The deﬁnition is the standard one in the literature [3].
As stated in Section 1 we capture both abduction and induction as a process of hypothesis generation given the back-
ground theory and observations. To understand two inference mechanisms in a uniﬁed framework, we deﬁne abduction in
a general setting.
Deﬁnition 2.1 (abductive theory). An abductive (ﬁrst-order) theory is deﬁned as a pair (B, H) where B and H are sets of ﬁrst-
order formulas, respectively representing the background theory and a candidate hypothesis. An abductive theory is called
propositional if both B and H are ﬁnite propositional theories.
Let O be any consistent formula representing an observation. Then, a set E ⊆ H is an explanation of O if
• B ∪ E | O , and
• B ∪ E is consistent.
An explanation is called ground if it contains no variable.
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tions and the background theory B , ﬁnd a hypothesis E such that B ∪ E | G where B ∪ E is consistent.1 Let us compare the
deﬁnitions of abduction and induction. First, abduction considers a single observation, while induction supposes multiple
observations. Since a ﬁnite set G of observations is represented as a single formula O =∧g∈G g , abduction is also used for
explaining multiple observations in general. Second, abduction selects explanations from a candidate hypothesis H , while
induction does not always have such a hypothesis set in advance. This situation in induction is represented by an abductive
theory (B, H) by putting H = F with the set F of all ﬁrst-order formulas in the language. Third, abduction is often distin-
guished from induction by the form of hypotheses: abduction computes hypothetical facts for explaining observations, while
induction computes hypothetical rules for that purpose. To ﬁll the gap, we provided a candidate hypothesis H as a set of
ﬁrst-order formulas. Fourth, induction often considers no background theory. In this situation, we can just put B = ∅ in an
abductive theory.
Thus, from the mathematical viewpoint, there is no essential difference between abduction and induction in Deﬁni-
tion 2.1. With this reason, we discuss equivalence issues in abduction hereafter, but similar results hold for induction as
well.
Note that in induction problems negative observations are often considered as well as positive ones. For any negative
observation G , the condition B ∪ E | G is requested for any explanation E . To handle negative observations, the notion of
anti-explanations in the context of extended abduction can be used [6]. Using extended abduction, equivalence problems in
this paper are extended to handle negative observations as well. For simplicity reasons, we handle positive observations
only in this paper. Equivalence of abductive theories in extended abduction is discussed in [10].
To study equivalence issues in abductive logic, Inoue and Sakama [9] introduce two different frameworks of abductive
equivalence.
Deﬁnition 2.2 (explainable equivalence). Two abductive theories (B1, H1) and (B2, H2) are explainably equivalent if, for any
observation O , there is an explanation of O in (B1, H1) iff there is an explanation of O in (B2, H2).
Deﬁnition 2.3 (explanatory equivalence). Two abductive theories (B1, H1) and (B2, H2) are explanatorily equivalent if, for any
observation O , there is an explanation E1 of O in (B1, H1) iff there is an explanation E2 of O in (B2, H2) such that E1 ≡ E2.
Explainable equivalence requires that two abductive theories have the same explainability for any observation. By con-
trast, explanatory equivalence assures that two abductive theories have the same explanation contents for any observation.
Explanatory equivalence is stronger than explainable equivalence and the former implies the latter.
Example 2.1. Consider two abductive theories (B1, H1) and (B2, H2) such that
B1: grass_is_wet ⊃ shoes_are_wet,
rained_last_night ⊃ grass_is_wet,
sprinkler_was_on⊃ grass_is_wet,
rained_last_night.
H1: sprinkler_was_on.
B2: grass_is_wet ⊃ shoes_are_wet,
rained_last_night ⊃ grass_is_wet,
sprinkler_was_on⊃ grass_is_wet.
H2: rained_last_night, sprinkler_was_on.
Then, (B1, H1) and (B2, H2) are explainably equivalent, but not explanatory equivalent. That is, every observation explain-
able in (B1, H1) is also explainable in (B2, H2), and vice versa. On the other hand, the observation O = shoes_are_wet has
the explanation E = ∅ in (B1, H1), but E does not explain O in (B2, H2).
Thus, two equivalence relations compare explanation power of abductive theories in different ways. Inoue and Sakama
[9] provide necessary and suﬃcient conditions for each equivalence relation. In the following, Th(Σ) denotes the set of
logical consequences of a set Σ of ﬁrst-order formulas.
Deﬁnition 2.4 (extension). Let (B, H) be an abductive theory. An extension of (B, H) is deﬁned as Th(B ∪ S) where S is a
maximal subset of H such that B ∪ S is consistent. The set of all extensions of (B, H) is denoted by Ext(B, H).
Theorem 2.1. (See [9].) Let (B1, H1) and (B2, H2) be two abductive theories. Then,
(1) (B1, H1) and (B2, H2) are explainably equivalent iff Ext(B1, H1) = Ext(B2, H2).
1 This type of induction is called explanatory induction [4].
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i = 1,2.
Since any element in Hi \ H ′i is of no use for explaining observations, two abductive theories are assumed to have a
common hypothesis set H for explanatory equivalence [9].
The next theorem states the computational complexity of each equivalence problem.
Theorem 2.2. (See [9].) The following complexity results holds with respect to the size of background theories and candidate hypothe-
ses.
(1) Deciding explainable equivalence of two propositional abductive theories is Π P2 -complete.
(2) Deciding explanatory equivalence of two propositional abductive theories is coNP-complete.
2.2. Abductive logic programming
Next, we consider the case that the underlying logic is abductive logic programming (ALP) [1]. In contrast to ﬁrst-order
logic, in ALP the background theory and a hypothesis are given as nonmonotonic logic programs in general. We ﬁrst review
deﬁnitions of basic notions.
A logic program considered in this paper is the class of general extended disjunctive program (GEDP) [7], which is a set of
rules of the form:
L1; · · · ; Lk;notLk+1; · · · ;notLl
← Ll+1, . . . , Lm,notLm+1, . . . ,notLn (nm l k 0)
where each Li is a positive/negative literal, i.e., A or ¬A for an atom A, and not is negation as failure. notL is called an
NAF-literal. The left-hand side of ← is the head, and the right-hand side is the body. A semicolon “;” in the head represents
disjunction, and a comma “,” in the body represents conjunction. The rule is read as: if all Ll+1, . . . , Lm are believed and all
Lm+1, . . . , Ln are disbelieved then either some Li (1 i  k) is believed or some L j (k + 1 j  l) is disbelieved.
For each rule r of the above form, head+(r), head−(r), body+(r) and body−(r) denote the sets of literals {L1, . . . , Lk},
{Lk+1, . . . , Ll}, {Ll+1, . . . , Lm}, and {Lm+1, . . . , Ln}, respectively. Also, not_head−(r) and not_body−(r) denote the sets of NAF-
literals {notLk+1, . . . ,notLl} and {notLm+1, . . . ,notLn}, respectively. A disjunction or conjunction of (NAF-)literals in a rule is
identiﬁed with its corresponding sets of (NAF-)literals. A rule r is often written as
head+(r);not_head−(r) ← body+(r),not_body−(r)
or head(r) ← body(r) where head(r) = head+(r) ∪ not_head−(r) and body(r) = body+(r) ∪ not_body−(r). A rule L ← is iden-
tiﬁed with the literal L. A program P is basic if head−(r) = body−(r) = ∅ for every rule r in P . A program P is an extended
disjunctive program (EDP) if head−(r) = ∅ for every rule r in P . A program, rule, or literal is ground if it contains no variable.
The domain of a program is given as the Herbrand universe, the set of all ground terms in the language. A program P with
variables is a shorthand of its ground instantiation, denoted as Ground(P ), the (possibly inﬁnite) set of ground rules obtained
from P by substituting variables in P by elements of its Herbrand universe in every possible way.
The semantics of a GEDP is given by the answer set semantics [5,7]. Let Lit be the set of all ground literals in the language
of a program. Consider a program P and a set of literals S ⊆ Lit. Then, the reduct P S is the program which contains the
ground rule head+(r) ← body+(r) iff there is a rule r in Ground(P ) such that head−(r) \ S = ∅ and body−(r) ∩ S = ∅. Given
a basic program P , let S be a set of ground literals satisfying the conditions:
(1) S satisﬁes every rule in P , that is, for any ground rule head+(r) ← body+(r) in Ground(P ), body+(r) ⊆ S implies
head+(r) ∩ S = ∅; and
(2) if S contains a pair of complementary literals L and ¬L, then S = Lit.
An answer set of a basic program P is a minimal set S satisfying the above two conditions. Given a GEDP P and a set S of
literals, S is an answer set of P if S is an answer set of P S . A program has none, one, or multiple answer sets in general. An
answer set is consistent if it is not Lit. A program is consistent if it has a consistent answer set; otherwise it is inconsistent.
The set of all answer sets of a program P is denoted by AS(P ).
Two programs P1 and P2 are equivalent if AS(P1) = AS(P2).
A literal L is a consequence of skeptical reasoning (resp. credulous reasoning) in a program P if L is included in every
(resp. some) answer set of P . The set of consequences of skeptical reasoning (resp. credulous reasoning) in P is denoted as
skp(P ) (resp. crd(P )). For a consistent program P , it holds that
skp(P ) =
⋂
S and crd(P ) =
⋃
S.
S∈AS(P ) S∈AS(P )
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Clearly, skp(P ) ⊆ crd(P ) holds for any consistent program P .
Example 2.2. Consider two programs:
P1: p ← not q,
q ← not p.
P2: p ← q,
q;not q ←
where AS(P1) = {{p}, {q}} and AS(P2) = {∅, {p,q}}. Then, skp(P1) = skp(P2) = ∅ and crd(P1) = crd(P2) = {p,q}.
Answer sets have the following property.
Proposition 2.3. (See [5].) If a program P is an EDP, AS(P ) is an antichain, that is, no element S ∈ AS(P ) is a proper subset of another
element T ∈ AS(P ).
The above proposition does not hold for GEDPs in general (see Example 2.2).
The next proposition is used later.
Proposition 2.4. Let P be a basic program. For any L ∈ Lit, L ∈ skp(P ) iff skp(P ) = skp(P ∪ {L}).
Proof. Suppose that P is consistent and L ∈ skp(P ). Then, L is included in any answer set S of P . Since P is a basic program,
S is a minimal set satisfying P . As L ∈ S , S is a minimal set satisfying P ∪ {L}. Thus, S is an answer set of P ∪ {L}. On the
other hand, any answer set T of P ∪ {L} contains L. As T is a minimal set satisfying P ∪ {L}, T satisﬁes P . If T is not
minimal, there is a minimal set T ′ ⊂ T satisfying P . Then, T ′ is an answer set of P , and becomes an answer set of P ∪ {L}.
This contradicts the antichain property of Proposition 2.3. Thus, T is a minimal set satisfying P , so T is an answer set of P .
Hence, AS(P ) = AS(P ∪{L}), thereby skp(P ) = skp(P ∪{L}). Conversely, suppose skp(P ) = skp(P ∪{L}). Clearly L ∈ skp(P ∪{L}),
thereby L ∈ skp(P ).
Next, suppose that P is inconsistent. By the deﬁnition, skp(P ) = Lit. When AS(P ) = {Lit}, any set S satisfying every rule
in P contains a pair of complementary literals. Then, any set S satisfying every rule in P ∪ {L} also contains a pair of
complementary literals. Thus, AS(P ∪ {L}) = {Lit} and skp(P ∪ {L}) = Lit. When AS(P ) = ∅, no set satisﬁes every rule in P .
Since P is basic, there is also no set satisfying every rule in P ∪ {L}. Thus, AS(P ∪ {L}) = ∅ and skp(P ∪ {L}) = Lit. Hence, the
result holds. 
Deﬁnition 2.5 (abductive program). An abductive program is deﬁned as a pair 〈 P ,A 〉 where P and A are GEDPs representing
the background theory and a candidate hypothesis, respectively. In particular, an abductive program 〈 P ,A 〉 is called an
abductive EDP if both P and A are EDPs. An abductive program 〈 P ,A 〉 is called an abductive deﬁnite program if both P and
A are deﬁnite logic programs, i.e., sets of deﬁnite Horn clauses. Any instance of an element in A is called an abducible. An
abductive program 〈 P ,A 〉 is called propositional if both P and A are ﬁnite ground programs.
In the literature of abductive logic programming, abducibles are usually restricted to (ground) literals. Any abductive pro-
gram 〈 P ,A 〉 which contains rules in A is transformed to a semantically equivalent abductive program in which abducibles
contain only literals. Given an abductive program 〈 P ,A 〉, let
P ′ = P ∪ {head(r) ← body(r), Ar | r ∈ A},
A′ = {Ar | r ∈ A},
where Ar is a newly introduced atom (called the name of r) uniquely associated with each rule r in A. With this setting,
for any observation in the language of 〈 P ,A 〉, there is a 1–1 correspondence between explanations in 〈 P ,A 〉 and those in
〈 P ′,A′ 〉.2
Deﬁnition 2.6 (belief sets). Let 〈 P ,A 〉 be an abductive program. For any E ⊆ A, a consistent answer set S of P ∪ E is called
a belief set of 〈 P ,A 〉 (with respect to E). A belief set is often denoted as SE when S is a belief set with respect to E . The
set of all belief sets of 〈 P ,A 〉 is represented as BS(P ,A).
Note that belief sets coincide with answer sets when A = ∅. That is, BS(P ,∅) = AS(P ).
We deﬁne an observation O as a conjunction of ground literals. O is identiﬁed with the set of ground literals included
in it. We assume that O is consistent, i.e., L ∈ O implies ¬L /∈ O for any L ∈ Lit.
2 The naming technique is introduced by Poole [15] in the context of default reasoning.
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is a credulous explanation of O in 〈 P ,A 〉 if O ⊆ SE for some belief set SE of 〈 P ,A 〉. A set E ⊆ A is a skeptical explanation
of O in 〈 P ,A 〉 if O ⊆ SE for every belief set SE of 〈 P ,A 〉.
A credulous or skeptical explanation is called ground if it contains no variable. Any skeptical explanation is also a cred-
ulous explanation, but not vice versa. Abduction for credulous explanations (resp. skeptical explanations) is also called
credulous abduction (resp. skeptical abduction).
Example 2.3. Let 〈 P ,A 〉 be an abductive program such that
P : watch-T V ; sleeping ← holiday,not busy,
working ← holiday, busy,
holiday← .
A: busy.
The observation O 1 = watch-T V has the empty set E1 = ∅ as the credulous explanation, but has no skeptical explanation.
The observation O 2 = working has the credulous and skeptical explanation E2 = {busy}.
Explainable and explanatory equivalence relations are introduced in the context of abductive logic programming.
Deﬁnition 2.8 (explainable and explanatory equivalence in ALP). Two abductive programs 〈 P1,A1 〉 and 〈 P2,A2 〉 are explain-
ably equivalent in credulous (resp. skeptical) abduction if, for any observation O , there is a credulous (resp. skeptical)
explanation of O in 〈 P1,A1 〉 iff there is a credulous (resp. skeptical) explanation of O in 〈 P2,A2 〉. Two abductive pro-
grams 〈 P1,A1 〉 and 〈 P2,A2 〉 are explanatorily equivalent in credulous (resp. skeptical) abduction if, for any observation O ,
there is a credulous (resp. skeptical) explanation E of O in 〈 P1,A1 〉 iff there is a credulous (resp. skeptical) explanation E
of O in 〈 P2,A2 〉.
In [9,11] necessary and suﬃcient conditions for explainable and explanatory equivalence in credulous abduction are
given. We review those results below, together with new results.3
Theorem 2.5. Let 〈 P1,A1 〉 and 〈 P2,A2 〉 be two abductive programs, and Ci = {E ⊆ Ai | Pi ∪ E is consistent} for i = 1,2. Then, the
following results hold.
(1) 〈 P1,A1 〉 and 〈 P2,A2 〉 are explainably equivalent in credulous abduction iff
max
(
BS(P1,A1)
)=max(BS(P2,A2))
where max(X) = {x ∈ X | ¬∃y ∈ X such that x⊂ y}.
(2) If 〈 P1,A1 〉 and 〈 P2,A2 〉 are explainably equivalent in skeptical abduction, then
⋃
E⊆A1
( ⋂
S∈AS(P1∪E)
S
)
=
⋃
F⊆A2
( ⋂
T∈AS(P2∪F )
T
)
.
(3) 〈 P1,A1 〉 and 〈 P2,A2 〉 are explanatorily equivalent in credulous abduction iff C1 = C2 and for any E ⊆ C1 ,
max
(
AS(P1 ∪ E)
)=max(AS(P2 ∪ E)).
(4) 〈 P1,A1 〉 and 〈 P2,A2 〉 are explanatorily equivalent in skeptical abduction iff C1 = C2 and for any E ⊆ C1 ,⋂
S∈AS(P1∪E)
S =
⋂
T∈AS(P2∪E)
T .
Proof. The results of (1) and (3) are due to [11]. Here we show (2) and (4).
(2) Put Ω1 =⋃E⊆A1 (⋂S∈AS(P1∪E) S) and Ω2 =⋃F⊆A2(⋂T∈AS(P2∪F ) T ). Suppose that Ω1 = Ω2. In this case, there is a
literal L in (Ω1 \ Ω2) ∪ (Ω2 \ Ω1). Without loss of generality, let L ∈ Ω1 \ Ω2. Then, L ∈⋂S∈AS(P1∪E) S for some E ⊆ A1, but
L /∈⋂T∈AS(P2∪F ) T for any F ⊆ A2. Then, O = L is explainable in P1 but unexplainable in P2. This contradicts the assumption
that 〈 P1,A1 〉 and 〈 P2,A2 〉 are explainably equivalent. Hence, the result holds.
(4) 〈 P1,A1 〉 and 〈 P2,A2 〉 are explanatorily equivalent in skeptical abduction ⇔ for any observation O , E is a skeptical
explanation of O in 〈 P1,A1 〉 iff E is a skeptical explanation of O in 〈 P2,A2 〉 ⇔ for any observation O , O is included in
3 In [9] conditions are given for observations that consist of a single literal. The result is generalized in [11] to observations that are conjunctions of
literals.
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Theorem 2.5(2) provides a necessary condition for explainable equivalence in skeptical abduction. Since explanatory
equivalence implies explainable equivalence, the condition of (4) is a suﬃcient condition for explainable equivalence in
skeptical abduction.
Theorem 2.6. The following complexity results hold with respect to the size of background theories and candidate hypotheses.
(1) Deciding explainable equivalence of two propositional abductive programs is Π P2 -hard in both credulous and skeptical abduction.
(2) Deciding explanatory equivalence of two propositional abductive programs is Π P2 -hard in both credulous and skeptical abduction.
Proof. (1) The problem contains a special case that a program P is an EDP and A is empty. In this case, max(BS(P ,A)) =
AS(P ), so the problem in credulous abduction reduces to deciding the equivalence relation AS(P1) = AS(P2) of two EDPs (by
Theorem 2.5(1)). The task is Π2P -complete [14], hence the result holds. To see the result in skeptical abduction, the problem
contains a special case that P is a basic program and A is empty. In this case, the problem reduces to deciding equivalence
of skeptical consequences between two background programs (by Theorem 2.5(2)(4)). By Proposition 2.4, skeptical reasoning
of a literal in a basic program can be transformed to the problem of deciding skp(P1) = skp(P2) in O (1). Because deciding
whether a literal is a skeptical consequence of a basic program is Π P2 -complete [2], the decision problem of skp(P1) =
skp(P2) is Π P2 -hard. Hence, the result holds. (2) Consider again a special case that P is an EDP and A is empty. In this
case, max(AS(P ∪ E)) = AS(P ), so the problem in credulous abduction reduces to deciding the equivalence relation AS(P1) =
AS(P2) of two EDPs (by Theorem 2.5(3)). The task is Π2P -complete and the result holds. The proof of skeptical abduction is
similar to the proof of (1). 
3. Equivalence of explanations
Next we turn to the problem of equivalence of explanations.
Deﬁnition 3.1 (equivalent explanation). Let (B, H) be an abductive theory. For any observation O , suppose that E1 is an
explanation of O in (B, H) iff E2 is an explanation of O in (B, H). In this case, E1 and E2 are equivalent explanations.
The notion of equivalent explanations provides a method for identifying different explanations which are abduced for an
arbitrary observation in a background theory. The next result holds for ﬁrst-order abduction.
Theorem 3.1. Let (B, H) be an abductive theory. Then, two explanations E1 and E2 are equivalent iff B ∪ E1 ≡ B ∪ E2 .
Proof. E1 and E2 are equivalent iff B ∪ E1 | O ⇔ B ∪ E2 | O for any formula O iff B ∪ E1 ≡ B ∪ E2. 
The above theorem presents that different formulas E1 and E2 can become an equivalent explanation depending on the
context of B .
Example 3.1. Given B = {p ⊃ q,q ⊃ p, p ∧ q ⊃ r} and H = {p,q}, E1 = {p}, E2 = {q}, and E3 = {p,q} are all equivalent
explanations.
In the context of abductive logic programming, the notion of equivalent explanations is deﬁned for credulous and skep-
tical abduction.
Deﬁnition 3.2 (equivalent explanation in ALP). Let 〈 P ,A 〉 be an abductive program. For any observation O , suppose that E1
is a credulous (resp. skeptical) explanation of O in 〈 P ,A 〉 iff E2 is a credulous (resp. skeptical) explanation of O in 〈 P ,A 〉.
In this case, E1 and E2 are equivalent explanations in credulous (resp. skeptical) abduction.
Proposition 3.2. Let 〈 P ,A 〉 be an abductive program.
(1) If two explanations E1 and E2 are equivalent in credulous abduction, crd(P ∪ E1) = crd(P ∪ E2).
(2) Two explanations E1 and E2 are equivalent in skeptical abduction iff skp(P ∪ E1) = skp(P ∪ E2).
Proof. (1) If two explanations E1 and E2 are equivalent in credulous abduction, for any observation O , O ⊆ S for some
consistent answer set S of P ∪ E1 iff O ⊆ T for some consistent answer set T of P ∪ E2. Put O = S . Then, for any consistent
answer set S of P ∪ E1, there is a consistent answer set T of P ∪ E2 such that S ⊆ T . Likewise, putting O = T , for any
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crd(P ∪ E2) holds. (2) If two explanations E1 and E2 are equivalent in skeptical abduction, for any observation O , O ⊆ S
for every consistent answer set S of P ∪ E1 iff O ⊆ T for every consistent answer set T of P ∪ E2. Hence, skp(P ∪ E1) =
skp(P ∪ E2). Conversely, if skp(P ∪ E1) = skp(P ∪ E2), for any observation O , O is included in every answer set S of P ∪ E1
iff O is included in every answer set S of P ∪ E2. Hence, the result follows. 
The converse of Proposition 3.2(1) does not hold in general.
Example 3.2. Let 〈 P ,A 〉 be an abductive program such that
P : p ← r,not q,
q ← s,not p,
p ← r, s,
q ← r, s.
A: r; s ←,
r ←,
s ← .
For E1 = {r; s ←} and E2 = {r ←, s ←}, it holds that crd(P ∪ E1) = crd(P ∪ E2) = {p,q, r, s}. However, E1 and E2 are not
equivalent in credulous abduction, since O = r, s is explained by E2 but not by E1.
The next theorem characterizes equivalence of explanations.
Theorem 3.3. Let 〈 P ,A 〉 be an abductive program. Then, two explanations E1 and E2 are equivalent (in both credulous and skeptical
abduction) if AS(P ∪ E1) = AS(P ∪ E2) where P ∪ E1 and P ∪ E2 are consistent. The only-if part also holds for credulous abduction if
〈 P ,A 〉 is an abductive EDP.
Proof. The if part is obvious for both skeptical and credulous abduction. We show the only-if part for credulous abduction.
Let P and A be EDPs. Suppose that AS(P ∪ E1) = AS(P ∪ E2) and there is a consistent answer set S such that S ∈ AS(P ∪
E1) \ AS(P ∪ E2). If S ⊂ Ti for any Ti ∈ AS(P ∪ E2), there is a literal L ∈ S \ Ti for any Ti . Let U be a ﬁnite set such that
U ⊆⋃i(S \ Ti). Then, U ⊆ S but U  Ti for any Ti . Thus, E1 explains U but E2 does not. This contradicts the equivalence
assumption of E1 and E2. So, S ⊂ T holds for some T ∈ AS(P ∪ E2) (†). Since AS(P ∪ E1) is an antichain, T /∈ AS(P ∪ E1). Then,
T ∈ AS(P ∪ E2) \ AS(P ∪ E1). Repeating the same argument as above, it is shown that T ⊂ S ′ holds for some S ′ ∈ AS(P ∪ E1).
By (†), S ⊂ S ′ holds for two answer sets S and S ′ of P ∪ E1. But this is impossible, since AS(P ∪ E1) is an antichain
(Proposition 2.3). 
The only-if part of Theorem 3.3 does not hold for abductive GEDPs in general.
Example 3.3. Let 〈 P ,A 〉 be an abductive program such that
P : p;not p ← .
A : p.
Then, E1 = ∅ and E2 = {p} are equivalent in credulous abduction, but AS(P ∪ E1) = {∅, {p}} and AS(P ∪ E2) = {{p}} are
different.
In skeptical abduction, the condition AS(P ∪ E1) = AS(P ∪ E2) is not necessary for the equivalence of explanations. For
instance, in the abductive program 〈 P ,A 〉 where P = ∅ and A = {p;q ←, r; s ←}, two skeptical explanations E1 = {p;q ←}
and E2 = {r; s ←} are equivalent but AS(P ∪ E1) = AS(P ∪ E2).
Theorem 3.4. The following complexity results hold with respect to the size of background theories and explanations.
(1) Deciding equivalence of two explanations in a propositional abductive theory is coNP-complete.
(2) Deciding equivalence of two explanations in a propositional abductive program is Π P2 -hard in credulous abduction. The decision
problem is Π P2 -complete for propositional abductive EDPs.
(3) Deciding equivalence of two explanations in a propositional abductive program is Π P2 -hard in skeptical abduction.
(4) Deciding equivalence of two explanations in a propositional abductive deﬁnite program can be done in polynomial time.
Proof. (1) As deciding logical equivalence of two propositional theories is coNP-complete, the result holds by Theorem 3.1.
(2) When 〈 P ,A 〉 is an abductive EDP, AS(P ∪ E1) = AS(P ∪ E2) becomes the necessary and suﬃcient condition (Theorem 3.3).
Since testing the equivalence of two (propositional) programs P ∪ E1 and P ∪ E2 is Π P -complete [14], the result holds.2
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problem is Π P2 -hard. (3) By Proposition3.2(2), the relation skp(P ∪ E1) = skp(P ∪ E2) is necessary and suﬃcient. The task
of deciding the equivalence of skeptical consequences is Π P2 -hard (Theorem 2.6). (4) In deﬁnite programs, credulous and
skeptical explanations coincide. Then, two ground explanations are equivalent if P ∪ E1 and P ∪ E2 have the same least
model. Checking the equivalence of two deﬁnite programs is done in polynomial time, and the result holds. 
4. Equivalence of observations
We ﬁnally consider the problem of equivalence of observations.
Deﬁnition 4.1 (equivalent observation). Given an abductive theory (B, H), two observations O 1 and O 2 are equivalent if, for
any E ⊆ H , E is an explanation of O 1 in (B, H) iff E is an explanation of O 2 in (B, H).
The notion of equivalent observations provides a method for identifying different evidences.
Theorem 4.1. Let (B, H) be an abductive theory. Then, two observations O 1 and O 2 are equivalent iff B | O 1 ≡ O 2 .
Proof. O 1 and O 2 are equivalent iff B ∪ E | O 1 ⇔ B ∪ E | O 2 for any E ⊆ H such that B ∪ E is consistent iff B ∪ E | O 1 ≡
O 2 for any E ⊆ H such that B ∪ E is consistent. Putting E = ∅, B | O 1 ≡ O 2. When B | O 1 ≡ O 2, B ∪ E | O 1 ≡ O 2 holds
for any E ⊆ H such that B ∪ E is consistent. Hence, the result holds. 
The result shows that equivalence of observations depends on the background theory but is independent of a candidate
hypothesis.
Example 4.1. Given (B1, H1) = ({p ⊃ q}, {p,q}), O 1 = p and O 2 = p ∧ q are equivalent. On the other hand, O 1 and O 2 are
not equivalent in (B2, H2) = ({p ∨ q}, {p,q}).
In the above example, the equivalence of O 1 and O 2 implies that the additional evidence q in O 2 has no effect on
constructing explanations in (B1, H1).
An equivalence relation between observations is deﬁned for abductive logic programming in both credulous and skeptical
abduction.
Deﬁnition 4.2 (equivalent observation in ALP). Given an abductive program 〈 P ,A 〉, two observations O 1 and O 2 are equivalent
in credulous (resp. skeptical) abduction if, for any E ⊆ A, E is a credulous (resp. skeptical) explanation of O 1 in 〈 P ,A 〉 iff
E is a credulous (resp. skeptical) explanation of O 2 in 〈 P ,A 〉.
For equivalence of observations, however, we have no simple characterization.
Theorem 4.2. Let 〈 P ,A 〉 be an abductive program.
(1) Two observations O 1 and O 2 are equivalent in credulous abduction iff for any E ⊆ A such that P ∪ E is consistent, if O 1 ⊆ S for
some S ∈ AS(P ∪ E), O 2 ⊆ T for some T ∈ AS(P ∪ E), and vice versa.
(2) Two observations O 1 and O 2 are equivalent in skeptical abduction iff for any E ⊆ A such that P ∪ E is consistent, if O 1 ⊆ S for
every S ∈ AS(P ∪ E), O 2 ⊆ S for every S ∈ AS(P ∪ E), and vice versa.
Proof. In credulous (resp. skeptical) abduction, O 1 and O 2 are equivalent iff for any E ⊆ A such that P ∪ E is consistent,
the fact that O 1 is included in some (resp. every) consistent answer set of P ∪ E implies that O 2 is included in some (resp.
every) consistent answer set of P ∪ E , and vice versa. Hence, the result holds. 
Example 4.2. Let 〈 P ,A 〉 be an abductive program such that
P : win ← lottery,not¬win,
¬win← lottery, not win.
A: lottery.
Then, O 1 = win and O 2 = ¬win are equivalent in both credulous and skeptical abduction.
In the above example, the equivalence of O 1 and O 2 presents a situation that win or ¬win could equally happen on the
same ground lottery.
For complexity, we have the next results.
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(1) Deciding equivalence of two observations in a propositional abductive theory is coNP-complete.
(2) Deciding equivalence of two observations in a propositional abductive program is Σ P2 -hard in credulous abduction and Π
P
2 -hard
in skeptical abduction.
Proof. (1) The problem is equivalent to checking unsatisﬁability of B∪{O 1 ≡ O 2} (by Theorem 4.1), which is a task of coNP-
complete. (2) The problem contains the case that the abducibles are empty. Given two observations O 1 and O 2, consider
the following two rules: G1 ← O 1 and G2 ← O 2, where G1 and G2 are new atoms appearing nowhere in 〈 P ,∅〉. Let P ′ be
the program which is obtained from P by adding these rules. Then, O 1 and O 2 are equivalent in credulous abduction iff
G1 ∈ S for some consistent S ∈ AS(P ′) implies G2 ∈ T for some consistent T ∈ AS(P ′), and vice versa. The task of checking
whether a literal is included in some answer set of a program is Σ P2 -complete [7]. Hence, the Σ
P
2 -hardness result holds.
In case of skeptical abduction, O 1 and O 2 are equivalent iff G1 ∈ S ⇔ G2 ∈ S for any consistent S ∈ AS(P ′). The task of
checking whether a literal is included in every answer set of a program is Π P2 -complete [7]. Hence, the Π
P
2 -hardness result
holds. 
5. Discussion
In this section, we compare conditions in different equivalence issues. First, recall the problem of equivalence of ab-
ductive theories. In ﬁrst-order abduction, explainable equivalence requires the equivalence of extensions, while explanatory
equivalence requires the logical equivalence of two abductive theories (Theorem 2.1). Explanatory equivalence is stronger
than explainable equivalence, while the task of deciding explanatory equivalence is not harder than the task of deciding
explainable equivalence (Theorem 2.2). In abductive logic programming, explainable and explanatory equivalence is checked
by comparing maximal elements of belief sets or answer sets of programs in credulous abduction. On the other hand,
skeptical abduction requires comparison of intersections of all belief sets (Theorem 2.5). Since belief sets are computable
using proof procedures of answer set programming, checking these equivalence relations is done with existing answer set
solvers. Computational cost of checking each equivalence is generally expensive (Theorem 2.6). As a special case, however,
explainable equivalence of two deﬁnite abductive programs, which has the background theory and a candidate hypothesis as
deﬁnite logic programs, can be decided in polynomial time [9]. This would be good news for existing ILP systems in which
background theories are usually given as deﬁnite logic programs.
Second, consider the problem of equivalence of explanations. In ﬁrst-order abduction, the problem is identical to judging
logical equivalence of two theories (Theorem 3.1). In abductive logic programming, the problem is identical to testing the
equivalence of two programs for abductive EDPs (Theorem 3.3). Checking equivalence of explanations in abductive logic
programming is generally harder than ﬁrst-order abduction (Theorem 3.4). In the problem of equivalence of observations,
it is identical to testing the logical equivalence of observations under an abductive theory in ﬁrst-order abduction (Theo-
rem 4.1). In abductive logic programming, comparison of skeptical (or credulous) consequences is requested (Theorem 4.2).
It is observed that abductive logic programming is again harder than ﬁrst-order abduction in general (Theorem 4.3). The
complexity results are summarized in Table 1.
Comparing ﬁrst-order abduction and abductive logic programming, logical equivalence characterizes each problem in
ﬁrst-order abduction. In abductive logic programming, on the other hand, different types of equivalence notions are used in
different problems. What makes comparison of abductive programs more complicated is nonmonotonicity in abductive logic
programming, which also makes computational task of equivalence testing harder than ﬁrst-order abduction in general.
The results of this paper also have an important implication in program development in abductive and inductive logic
programming. For instance, it is known that partial deduction in logic programming does not preserve explanations in ab-
ductive logic programming [17]. Consider the abductive program 〈 P ,A 〉:
P : shoes_are_wet ← grass_is_wet,
grass_is_wet ← rained_last_night,
grass_is_wet ← sprinkler_was_on.
A: grass_is_wet.
Table 1
Computational complexity.
Logic Abductive theories
(explainable/explanatory)
Explanations Observations
FOL (propositional) Π P2 -complete/coNP-complete coNP-complete coNP-complete
ALP (credulous) Π P2 -hard Π
P
2 -hard
a Σ P2 -hard
(skeptical) Π P2 -hard Π
P
2 -hard Π
P
2 -hard
a Completeness holds for (propositional) EDPs.
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atom grass_is_wet, however, P becomes
P ′: shoes_are_wet ← rained_last_night,
shoes_are_wet ← sprinkler_was_on,
grass_is_wet ← rained_last_night,
grass_is_wet ← sprinkler_was_on.
As a result, in the abductive program 〈 P ′,A 〉, the observation O = shoes_are_wet has no explanation. Thus, both explainable
and explanatory equivalences are not preserved by partial deduction. This example illustrates that basic program transfor-
mations widely used in program development in logic programming are not always applicable to optimize background
theories in ALP/ILP. If applied, explanations of abduction and induction may change in general. The notion of explainable
and explanatory equivalence provides a condition which any reasonable optimization in ALP/ILP should satisfy. The paper
[17] introduces some program transformations that preserve abductive explanations, so that they preserve explainable and
explanatory equivalence. Program development and optimization issues for abductive or inductive theories have been less
explored and are to be further investigated.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we studied different types of equivalence relations in abduction and induction: explainable and explanatory
equivalence of abductive theories, equivalence of explanations, and equivalence of observations. In each case, necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for equivalence as well as computational complexity results were investigated, under both classical
logic and nonmonotonic logic programming. These results shed light on the equivalence issue in non-deductive reasoning
and are applied to a general hypothetico-deductive framework.
A recent study [11] introduces methods for comparing explanation power of different abductive theories—one is compar-
ing explainability for observations, and the other is comparing explanation contents for observations. Those two measures
are represented by generality relations over abductive theories. The generality relations are naturally related to the notion
of abductive equivalence of [9,10]. Similar orderings over explanations or observations could be considered for comparing
explanations or observations, and would be related to equivalence relations of this paper. Those topics are left for future
research.
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